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While up to the late 1990s Japanese foreign exchange intervention was fully sterilized, Japa-
nese monetary authorities left foreign exchange intervention unsterilized when Japan entered 
the liquidity trap in 1999. According to previous research on foreign exchange intervention, 
unsterilized intervention has a higher probability of success than sterilized intervention. Based 
on a GARCH framework and change point detection, we test for a structural break in the ef-
fectiveness of Japanese foreign exchange intervention. We find a changing impact of Japanese 
foreign exchange intervention on exchange rate volatility at the turn of the millennium when 
Japanese foreign exchange intervention started to remain unsterilized.  
 
 
Keywords:  Japan, Foreign Exchange Intervention, Exchange Rate Volatility, GARCH, 
Change Point Detection, Structural Breaks. 
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Since the early 1990s up to March 2004, the scope of Japanese foreign exchange intervention 
has increased significantly. Japanese foreign exchange intervention has dwarfed US official 
foreign currency transactions both in terms of intervention events and in terms of cumulative 
intervention volume.  
 
While an increasing number of papers have tested for the effects of foreign exchange inter-
vention on the yen/dollar exchange rate level and volatility, rather few have scrutinized the 
possibility of a structural break in the effectiveness. A structural break may be due to the fact 
that since the turn of the millennium Japanese monetary authorities have left intervention un-
sterilized to increase the liquidity supply to the sluggish Japanese economy. According to 
previous studies unsterilized intervention has a much higher probability of success than steril-
ized intervention. 
 
To test for the effectiveness of Japanese foreign exchange intervention we focus on the rela-
tionship between interventions and exchange rate volatility. Intervention is regarded as suc-
cessful if the volatility of the involved currency pair is reduced significantly.  For this purpose 
we use a GARCH model with interventions as exogenous variables for mean and volatility. 
The model provides evidence that for the overall sample, intervention increases volatility and 
therefore seems unsuccessful.  
 
We use several approaches to identify possible parameter changes during the observation pe-
riod. Segmentation by single years and intervention clusters suggest a structural break around 
the turn of the millennium. A change-point detector which provides non-arbitrary segments 
for local GARCH estimations as well as rolling GARCH(1,1) estimations confirm the result.  
 
While the GARCH framework does not allow identifying the reasons for the structural break 
in the effects of Japanese foreign exchange intervention on exchange rate volatility, the identi-












Since the early 1990s up to March 2004, the scope of Japanese foreign exchange intervention 
has increased significantly. With the export sector remaining the most reliable pillar of 
economic growth, Japanese monetary authorities have been tempted to sustain output by 
dollar purchases.
2 Japanese foreign exchange intervention has dwarfed US official foreign 
currency transactions since the early 1990s both in terms of intervention events and in terms 
of cumulative intervention volume. 
  Recent research on Japanese foreign exchange intervention has tested for the effects 
on the exchange rate level (e.g., Ito 2003, Kearns and Rigobon 2005) or the exchange rate 
volatility (e.g., Castren 2004, Galati, Melick, and Micu (2005), Watanabe and Harada 2006, 
Frenkel, Pierdzioch, and Stadtmann 2005a). While most studies assume that the impact of 
interventions on the exchange rate is constant over time, Ito (2003) identifies a structural 
break in the effects of Japanese foreign exchange intervention around 1995, which he 
attributes to a different intervention pattern introduced by “Mr. Yen”, Eisuke Sakakibara (i.e. 
a smaller number of large interventions rather than a large number of small interventions). 
  In this paper, we focus on the relation between interventions and exchange rate 
volatility, defining successful intervention as inducing a reduction of the volatility of the 
involved currency.  We use a GARCH model with interventions as exogenous variables for 
mean and volatility of the yen/dollar exchange rate. In contrast to most former studies, we use 
several approaches to identify possible parameter changes during the observation period. A 
change-point detector provides non-arbitrary segments for local GARCH estimation. 
Segmentations by intervention periods, calendar years and rolling GARCH(1,1) estimations 
provide additional evidence.   
  We find that Japanese foreign exchange intervention increased volatility before 1997 
and decreased volatility after the year 2000. For the period between 1997 and 2000 the 
evidence is mixed. Although we are not able to directly introduce the degree of sterilization of 
foreign exchange intervention into our GARCH framework, the negative relationship between 
Japanese foreign exchange intervention and yen/dollar exchange rate volatility coincides with 
                                                 
2   According to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law (article 7, paragraph 3), the Ministry of Finance is in charge 
of Japanese foreign exchange intervention. The central bank acts solely as an agent (Article 36 and article 40; paragraph 
2, Bank of Japan Law) and buys or sells foreign currency on the government’s account.  
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the so-called liquidity trap when Japanese foreign exchange intervention could be allowed to 
affect the monetary base. 
 
2. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
Given the large scope of Japanese foreign exchange intervention, an extensive discussion on 
the effects of Japanese foreign exchange intervention has evolved. The theoretical research 
has focused primarily on so-called sterilized intervention, which neutralizes the effects of 
official currency purchases on the monetary base by offsetting domestic open market 
operations and thereby leaves the interest rate unchanged. Up to the late 1990s, Japan’s 
foreign exchange intervention was completely and instantaneously sterilized, as is generally 
the case for the major central banks (Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of 
Japan). In practice, the Japanese Ministry of Finance raised the amount of yen that was 
required to buy dollars by issuing financing bills thereby ensuring “automatic” sterilization.  
After the so-called Jurgensen report (Jurgensen 1983) there has been a broad 
discussion whether sterilized foreign exchange intervention is capable of successfully 
targeting a certain exchange rate level or volatility. Sarno and Taylor (2001) and Neely (2005) 
give comprehensive overviews. The portfolio balance models—based on the assumption that 
foreign and domestic assets are imperfect substitutes—argued that sterilized intervention can 
effect the exchange rate by changing the relative supplies and thereby the relative returns of 
foreign and domestic assets (Rogoff 1984).
3  
An empirical test of the portfolio balance model by Dominguez and Frankel (1993b) 
supported this view for Japanese foreign exchange intervention between 1984 and 1990. They 
obtained similar results for US and German interventions (Dominguez and Frankel 1993a). 
More recently, Ramaswamy and Samiei (2000) argued that Japanese foreign exchange 
interventions in the yen/dollar market during the 1990s have been "at least partially effective” 
and that even sterilized interventions have mattered in the yen/dollar market. An extensive 
study by Ito (2003) concludes that Japanese foreign exchange interventions under Eisuke 
Sakakibara have (for the most part) produced the intended effects on the yen/dollar rate 
during the second half of the 1990s. Fatum and Hutchison (2003) find evidence for successful 
sterilized foreign exchange intervention for US and German intervention based on an event 
study approach. Evans and Lyons (2002) have provided support that secret interventions 
                                                 
3   Further, the so-called signalling effect is identified as an effective transmission channel of sterilized foreign exchange 
intervention. However, because successful signalling announces a change in fundamentals (interest rate) it can be 
regarded as (a first step of) unsterilized intervention.  
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(common practice of the Japanese monetary authorities) have been effective via the order 
flow channel. 
In contrast, Sarno and Taylor (2001) argue that—at least among the currencies of the 
major industrial countries where capital markets have become increasingly integrated and the 
degree of substitutability between financial assets has increased—sterilized intervention does 
not affect exchange rates through the portfolio channel. According to Dominguez (1998), 
sterilized foreign exchange intervention can by definition not influence the exchange rate 
since it leaves the domestic money supply unchanged. If the official foreign currency 
transactions do not affect domestic interest rates—and thus do not trigger adjustments in the 
international investment portfolios—the intervention volumes are too small in relation to the 
huge international foreign exchange markets to have a sustained effect.  
The impact of foreign exchange intervention on volatility in foreign exchange markets 
is the second main line of discussion. Assuming rational expectations, Dominguez (1998) 
suggests that fully credible and unambiguous sterilized foreign exchange intervention can 
reduce volatility in efficient foreign exchange markets. De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2003) show 
in a stochastic model with chartists and fundamentalists that systematic sterilized intervention 
can be effective by reducing noise generated by chartist forecast rules. Jeanne and Rose 
(2002) assume endogenous noise trading and argue that it is possible to reduce exchange rate 
volatility without sacrificing monetary autonomy. Castren (2004) finds a significant impact of 
interventions in the yen/dollar market on all moments of estimated options-implied risk 
neutral density functions. Watanabe and Harada (2006) apply a component GARCH model to 
Japan’s foreign exchange intervention between 1990 to 2000 and find a significant effect on 
lower short-term but not on long-term yen/dollar volatility. 
In contrast, Schwartz (1996) contends that foreign exchange intervention is an 
“exercise in futility” which is likely to increase uncertainty and volatility. Bonser-Neal and 
Tanner (1996) support Schwartz’s analysis using implied volatilities of currency option 
prices. They find that Japanese foreign exchange intervention increased the volatility in the 
yen/dollar foreign exchange markets during the period from 1987 to 1991. Galati, Melick, and 
Micu (2005) contend that for the period from 1993 to 1996, Japanese foreign exchange 
intervention has increased foreign exchange traders’ uncertainty regarding future exchange 
rate movements. Finally, Fratzscher (2005) argues that verbal foreign exchange "intervention" 
can reduce exchange rate volatility while actual interventions raise it. 
In summary, although Sarno and Taylor (2001) state that the recent literature gives 
more evidence in favor of success, the general theoretical and empirical evidence for the  
9
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effects of foreign exchange intervention on the level and volatility of exchange rates remains 
mixed. For the case of Japan, however, recently the evidence in favor of intervention that is 
effectively influencing the exchange rate levels or volatility has become stronger (Ito 2003, 
Fatum and Hutchison 2003, Castren 2004, Watanabe and Harada 2006).   
  This might be due to the fact that Japanese foreign exchange intervention seems to 
have remained effectively unsterilized since 1999. While before 1999, foreign exchange 
intervention by the Japanese Ministry of Finance was fully and instantaneously sterilized by 
the Bank of Japan, this “liquidity constraint” was removed afterwards. Under zero interest 
rates, which were reached during 1999, the monetary base could grow at any desired level 
without interfering with the zero-interest rate target of monetary policy. Since March 2001, 
the Bank of Japan shifted the operating target for money market operations from the 
uncollateralized overnight call rate to the outstanding balance of current accounts (Spiegel 
2003). This may have put a constraint on liquidity growth in times of foreign exchange 
intervention. However, as shown in Figure 1, the ceiling of the Bank of Japan current 
accounts has grown steadily on a monthly basis together with the cumulated foreign exchange 
intervention volume until early 2004.
4 The upshot is that after 1999 foreign exchange 
intervention could be used as an instrument to increase money supply and to keep interest 
rates at the zero level. This would correspond to unsterilized intervention which is likely to 
increase the probability of success. 
 
3 DATA   
 
We use daily data provided by Bloomberg, Datastream, the Japanese Ministry of Finance, and 
the Federal Reserve Board (Figure 2 and Figure 3). The observation period is from April 1, 
1991—when the first data on Japanese foreign exchange intervention became available—up 
to October 2004.
5 This corresponds to a sample size of 3542 observations. 
The data on the yen/dollar exchange rate are spot prices by Bloomberg from three time 
zones: Tokyo closing rates (5 p.m.), London 5 p.m. (corresponding to Tokyo 2 a.m. on the 
next day and New York noon on the same day) and New York closing rates (Tokyo 7 a.m the 
next day, London 10 p.m. the same day).
6 The daily log returns and squared log returns are 
plotted in Figure 4. 
                                                 
4   There is no evidence that the current balances were adjusted on a daily basis. 
5   As of today (January 2006), the Japanese Ministry of Finance has not reported any interventions after October 2004. 
6    Bloomberg series JPY CMPT, JPY CMPL, and JPY CMPN.  
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Daily data on Japanese foreign exchange intervention are provided by the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance starting in April 1, 1991.
7 The amounts are in billion yen subdivided into 
purchases and sales of dollar, mark (euro) and other currencies, for which the intervention 
volumes are negligible. Since we focus on the yen/dollar exchange rate, only dollar transac-
tions are included in our sample. The yen amounts are converted into trillion dollars based on 
daily exchange rates. Out of 3542 trading days, the Ministry of Finance reports 344 dollar 
intervention days—311 dollars purchases and 33 dollar sales (Table 1).  
The US foreign exchange intervention data are provided by the Federal Reserve Board 
and are sub-divided into yen, mark
8 and other currencies purchased and sold. The reported 
scale is in million dollars, we convert it into trillion dollars. As in the case of Japan, only the 
yen transactions are included in the sample. The Federal Reserve Board reports 22 interven-
tion days in the yen/dollar market for the observation period—18 days with dollar purchases 
(yen sales) and 4 days with dollar sales (yen purchases). The last US-Japanese joint interven-
tion was in June 1998. 
To control for disturbances in other asset markets, we follow Bonser-Neal and Tanner 
(1996) and include daily returns of Japanese and US stock indices, the Nikkei 300 for Japan 
and the Dow Jones Industrial Average for the US, both provided by Datastream. The aug-
mented Dickey and Fuller (1979) test as well as the Philips and Perron (1988) test reject the 
unit root hypothesis for the daily log-returns of the yen/dollar rate, the Nikkei 300, the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average as well as for the intervention data at all common confidence levels. 
 
4  REACTION FUNCTION 
 
Foreign exchange intervention may target the level or the volatility of the exchange rate or 
both. If the exchange rate appreciates (depreciates) above (below) a certain level, the mone-
tary authorities might intervene to smooth the long-term swings of the exchange rate level. 
For instance, the Louvre-target zones (established in February 1987) intended to prevent the 
exchange rate from surpassing certain levels between dollar, yen and German mark.
9 Simi-
larly, financial press reports suggested that during the 1990s and particularly in the new mil-
lennium, Japanese monetary authorities tried to prevent the yen from rising above certain lev-
els in order to sustain the competitiveness of the Japanese export industry.
  10 As shown in 
                                                 
7   The exact intervention time, the number of interventions within a day, the intervention market (Tokyo, London, New 
York), and the exchange rate at the time of intervention remain undisclosed. 
8   The US interventions that have taken place since the introduction of the euro are negligible. 
9   The communiqué stated that current exchange rates were “broadly consistent with underlying fundamentals” (Funabashi 
1988) which implied target zones around the (by that time) present levels. 
10   For instance, Financial Times October 17, 2003, Bloomberg News January 7, 2004, Financial Times January 23, 2004.  
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Figure 5, Japanese foreign exchange intervention is more intense in periods of appreciation. 
In some cases, the financial press even believed to have identified informal target zones—for 
instance between 115 and 122 yen per dollar in the first seven months of 2003.
11 
Further, foreign exchange intervention may intend to reduce exchange rate volatility. 
In countries with free trade and capital flows (such as Japan and the US), exchange rate vola-
tility is high and pervasive. If monetary authorities want to reduce exchange rate volatility, 
volatility triggers intervention. McKinnon and Schnabl (2004) show that many smaller East 
Asian countries such as Taiwan, Korea or Singapore reduce exchange rate volatility on a daily 
basis. If intervention is less regular, it may occur in periods of turbulent foreign exchange 
markets. For the case of Japan, such an influence of exchange rate volatility on intervention is 
not obvious in Figure 6, which plots yen/dollar exchange rate volatility (defined as rolling 
standard deviation) and the absolute volume of Japan’s official dollar transactions.  
To test for the impact of both the exchange rate level and exchange rate volatility on 
Japanese foreign exchange rate intervention, we estimate a reaction function.  Since our main 
interest is to specify a model for the effect of interventions on volatility, the coefficient of 
volatility in the reaction function will indicate if we incur simultaneity bias in the GARCH 
volatility equation.   
  We use the following specification: First, the Japanese monetary authorities might 
decide to buy or sell dollars based on the exchange rate movements of the previous day, 
mostly to prevent the yen from appreciating. To capture this “leaning against the wind”, we 
introduce the yen/dollar returns of the previous day (rt-1) as explanatory variable. Second, the 
decision to intervene in foreign exchange markets might be based on medium-term factors. 
The more the exchange rate level departs from a certain level—which is regarded as an ade-
quate exchange rate level by the monetary authorities—the higher is the probability of inter-
vention. Ito (2003) specifies the level that Japanese monetary authorities regard as appropriate 
during the 1990s to 125 yen per dollar. We use the mean of the yen/dollar level over the ob-
servation period and a one month lag of the exchange rate  t e  for the calculation of the me-
dium-term deviation  ) ( 21 − − t e e  of the yen/dollar exchange rate. Here,  ∑ = T e e t /  is the 
global sample average and  21 − t e  the one-month lagged exchange rate.
12  
  Since the monetary authorities might attempt to reduce exchange rate volatility, we 
introduce the squared returns of the previous day 
2
1) ( − t r  as explanatory variable. Furthermore, 
                                                 
11   As reported by Deutsche Bank Global Investment Committee (June 16, 2003) and Financial Times (August 7, 2003). 
12   Alternative benchmarks such as Ito’s (2003) 125 yen/dollar bliss point, moving averages or the consumer price based 
purchasing power parity lead to similar results.  
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following Ito (2003) and Frenkel, Pierdzioch, and Stadtmann (2005b), we introduce the for-
eign exchange intervention dummy of the previous period  ) ( 1
D
t I −  as explanatory variable, since 





t t t t
D
t I r e e r I ε α α α α α + + + − + + = − − − − 1 4
2
1 3 21 2 1 1 0 ) ( ) (               (1) 
 
In equation (1), 
D
t I denotes the dummy for foreign exchange intervention of the same day. A 
binary probit model is estimated for (a) purely Japanese intervention and (b) pooled Japanese 
and US intervention, using New York closing rates.
13  
  The estimation results are reported in Table 2. They give very clear evidence that 
Japanese foreign exchange intervention targets the exchange rate level. Both variables captur-
ing the short-term (rt-1) and medium term changes  ) ( 21 − − t e e  in the exchange rate level have 
the expected negative sign and are significant at the 1%-level. If the dollar depreciates, the 
Japanese authorities are likely to intervene; if the dollar appreciates, they are unlikely to inter-
vene, reflecting the sustained upward pressure of the yen. In contrast, there is no evidence that 
the volatility of the yen/dollar exchange rate 
2
1) ( − t r  had any impact on the intervention of 
Japanese monetary authorities during the observation period. As expected, the lagged inter-
vention dummy  ) ( 1
D
t I −  is positive and significant at the 1%-level.
14  We can therefore conclude 
that for our data set we will not encounter simultaneity bias in a model that relates exchange 
rate volatility to interventions. 
Estimations of the reaction function for several sub-periods yield similar results, but 
are not reported here for brevity. For further analyses of reaction functions of the Japanese 
authorities, see Dominguez (1998), Frenkel, Pierdzioch and Stadtmann (2004, 2005b), Ito 
(2003), and Ito and Yabu (2004)
15.   
                                                 
13   We use New York closing rates to avoid possible endogeneity bias from interventions that precede exchange rate fixing, 
as Japanese foreign exchange intervention might be conducted by the Federal Reverve in the New York market on behalf 
of the Bank of Japan. 
14   The result is not sensitive to using a logit instead of a probit model. 
15   Ito (2003) uses a GMM estimation with full intervention volumes which yields similar results. An alternative approach to 
reaction functions is provided by Ito and Yabu (2004). We estimated the Ito and Yabu (2004) ordered probit specification 
and obtained the qualitatively same result that the squared returns have no significance in the reaction function.  The es-
timated limit points for pooled interventions were  * * * 49 . 0 1 − = µ  and  * * * 06 . 4 2 = µ , respectively. For the Japanese 
interventions only, the numbers were very similar.  
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5  GARCH ESTIMATION 
 
To measure the effects of foreign exchange intervention on the yen/dollar exchange rate vola-
tility we use a GARCH model with exogenous intervention data in both the conditional mean 
and variance equations as proposed by Engle (1982), Bollerslev (1986), and Baillie and 
Bollerslev (1989). We draw on the result in Section 3 that volatility does not determine inter-
vention and interpret the conditional variance equation only.  We do include the interventions 
into the mean equation to avoid omitted variable bias but do not interpret the estimated coef-
ficients, which probably suffer from simultaneous equation bias. This procedure follows 
Dominguez (1998). 
5.1   Specification 
Table 1 gives the necessary information for the GARCH model specification. First, we ob-
serve that in contrast to the US, Japanese foreign exchange intervention is highly focused on 
the yen/dollar market. Since 98.41% of Japanese foreign exchange intervention is against the 
US dollar, we exclude other yen exchange rates—for instance against the euro (German mark 
before 1999)—from the investigation.
16 
  Second, Japan has a much higher propensity to intervene in foreign exchange markets 
than the US, both in terms of intervention days and absolute intervention volume. The number 
of intervention days in the yen/dollar market is more than 15 times higher (Japan 344, US 22) 
and the discrepancy between the transactions volumes is even more pronounced (615.49 bil-
lion dollars in Japan and 8.4 billion dollars in the US). We further observe that all 22 US in-
tervention days in the yen/dollar markets coincide with Japanese intervention days; the prob-
ability of Japanese intervention conditional on US intervention is 100%. This indicates that 
US intervention is coordinated with Japanese intervention. Ito (2003) and Sakakibara (2000) 
provide anecdotal evidence for this.  
To deal with both the asymmetric scope of intervention and multicollinearity between 
US and Japanese intervention, we use two approaches. First, we estimate the impact of Japa-
nese intervention alone. Second, we pool US and Japanese foreign exchange intervention to 
create one exogenous variable  t I  which represents Japan’s efforts to redirect the yen/dollar 
rate. This specification is justified by the fact that US intervention is only in support of Japa-
nese intervention. We expect that both results are similar because US intervention is negligi-
ble and the last joint intervention took place in 1998. 
                                                 
16   48.7% of US foreign exchange intervention is against the yen during the observation period.  
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Furthermore, Sarno and Taylor (2001) argue that coordinated sterilized intervention 
between two or more countries might convince speculators that the signalled policy is more 
credible than a single-country intervention. However, a dummy for coordinated intervention 
remains insignificant for the US-Japanese case since 1991, therefore it is not included in the 
specification. 
Third, dollar purchases in Japan clearly dominate intervention activities (Figure 5). 
Out of 344 intervention days, dollars were purchased on 311 intervention days (90%), on 33 
days (10%) dollars were sold. In terms of absolute intervention volumes, 577.79 billion dol-
lars were purchased (93.87%) and 37.70 billion dollars were sold (6.13%). Due to the com-
paratively small amount of Japanese dollar sales, we do not estimate the effects of dollar pur-
chases and dollar sales separately, but treat intervention as one time series with positive sign 
for dollar purchases and negative sign for dollar sales.   
 
This leads to the following GARCH specification: 
 
, 3 2 1 0 t t t t t DOW b Nikkei b I b b r ε + + + + =               (2) 
) , 0 ( ~ |
1 t t h N
t− Ω ε ,        (3) 





t t t i t i i t i t ,..., , max , | | | | | |
11
3 2 1
2 = + + + + + = ∑∑
==
− − γ γ γ β ε α ω .        (4) 
 
In equation (2), rt denotes the logarithmic returns of the yen/dollar spot exchange rate, plotted 
in the left panel of Figure 4 for the Tokyo closing rate. Following Bonser-Neal and Tanner 
(1996), we include the daily returns of Japanese and US stock markets, Nikkei 300 and Dow 
Jones Industrial Average, as exogenous variables to control for the impact of disturbances in 
other asset markets. The correlation between the Nikkei and Dow series does not affect our 
main findings: excluding one or the other variable does not change the results. We do not in-
clude any dummies for the announcement of interest rate changes because they do not yield 
any significant results.
17 In contrast to Dominguez (1998) and Baillie and Osterberg (1997), 
we also do not include dummy variables for the day of the week and holidays in the variance 
equation. Doornik and Ooms (2003) show that this procedure may lead to degenerated likeli-
hood surfaces. 
                                                 
17   As shown by Watanabe (1994), Japanese foreign exchange intervention might signal a change in fundamentals (monetary 
policy). The failure to trace the impact of the announced interest rate changes on the exchange rate might be due to the 
fact that markets gradually anticipate interest rate changes.  
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    In equation (3), the disturbances εt are modelled as normally distributed conditional on 
the information set Ωt-1 available at time t-1, with zero mean and variance ht. Equation (4) 
models the volatility of the yen/dollar exchange rate, plotted in the lower left panel of Figure 
4. The variance ht depends on past disturbances εt-i, the lagged conditional variance ht-i, the 
absolute official foreign currency intervention |It|, and the volatility in the Japanese and US 
share markets defined as the modulus of daily returns, |Nikkeit |and |Dowt|.
18 
    To capture the immediate impact of foreign exchange intervention on exchange rate 
volatility, the intervention variable |It| and the control variables |Nikkeit| and |Dowt |are not 
lagged in the volatility equation. The lag-structure of our GARCH model is specified in two 
ways. First, we specify the number of lags by the Bayes information criterion (BIC) for mod-
els of the order  {} 7 ,..., 1 ∈ p  and  {} 7 ,..., 1 ∈ q . As a benchmark, we also estimate the GARCH(1, 1) 
specification, which is usually sufficient to eliminate ARCH-effects from the residuals. 
    Since both causality directions—interventions trigger changes in returns or changes in 
returns trigger interventions—are plausible, any single equation econometric model relating 
returns and interventions could suffer from possible simultaneous equation bias. We follow 
Dominguez (1998) and understand interventions to be successful if they reduce volatility de-
fined as squared returns. Since we show in the reaction function estimation in Section 4 that 
changes in volatility do not trigger interventions, we can reasonably rule out that simultaneity 
bias influences our results.
19  
5.2   Global  Results 
Table 3 reports the estimates of equations (2) to (4) on daily data between April 1, 1991, and 
October 27, 2004. The results are reported for the yen/dollar exchange rate in different mar-
kets and thereby time zones, i.e. Tokyo 5 p.m. (closing rates), London 5 p.m. (equivalent to 
New York noon) and New York 5 p.m. (closing rates). The results are reported for Japanese 
intervention only and for pooled Japanese and US intervention. US interventions alone are not 
reported because they would be subject to omitted-variable bias.
20 Furthermore, we report the 
lag order specification favored by a search for the lowest BIC as well as a GARCH(1,1) 
specification.  
  If Japanese intervention takes place during the Tokyo market opening hours, it pre-
cedes the time stamps of all three exchange rate series. Pooled intervention precedes the New 
                                                 
18   We assume that dollar sales and dollar purchases affect the volatility in the same way. 
19   Kearns and Rigobon (2005) study the impact of interventions on observable returns using a simulated GMM approach. 
20   The omitted variable is Japanese intervention which coincides with US intervention and has a much larger scope.  
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York closing rate only. If the New York Fed intervenes on behalf of the Japanese monetary 
authorities in the US markets, intervention precedes New York closing rates only. 
In equation (4), the coefficient γ1 estimates the impact of the absolute foreign ex-
change intervention on the volatility of the yen/dollar exchange rate. Table 3 shows that all γ1 
coefficients are positive and some are significant at the common levels. Foreign exchange 
intervention seems to increase the volatility of the yen/dollar exchange rate. Yet for some 
time zones and GARCH specifications, the coefficient is insignificant. The global GARCH 
estimation yields ambiguous results. 
  Hillebrand (2005) shows that neglecting parameter changes in GARCH models leads 
to an estimated sum of autoregressive parameters close to one.  If we estimate a simple 
GARCH(1,1) model on the yen/dollar exchange rate without explanatory variables in the 
conditional variance equation, the sum of the estimated autoregressive parameters is close to 
one.  If the intervention series is introduced as explanatory variable, this sum is reduced sub-
stantially to the order of 0.90 approximately. This may indicate that the intervention series 
captures changing volatility regimes. We segment the data and estimate the model locally to 
shed more light on this issue. 
5.3   Local Results 
The global estimation might not account for parameter changes that are frequently observed 
for the volatility of financial time series (for example, Andreou and Ghysels 2002).  To cope 
with this problem, we re-estimate our GARCH model for sub-periods.
21 As a first step, we 
subdivide our observation period into calendar years. Although this partition is arbitrary from 
a statistical perspective and might yield too short observation periods, we get a first notion of 
changing parameters. We use New York closing rates for this estimation to ensure that inter-
vention clearly precedes the exchange rate fixing.  
The results of the local yearly GARCH estimations are reported in Table 4.  The γ1 co-
efficient is positive and significant at the common levels in the years 1993, 1995, and 1997, 
suggesting in line with Galati, Melick and Micu (2005) that Japanese foreign exchange inter-
vention may have increased the volatility of the yen/dollar exchange rate. In the year 1996 
and from 1999 up to 2004, the γ1 coefficient is negative and significant at the common levels, 
possibly providing evidence of reduced exchange rate volatility. While we find reduced vola-
                                                 
21   The estimations of the reaction functions as specified in equation (1) for the respective sub-periods lead to similar results 
as the global reaction function.   
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tility in 1996, there is a robust relationship between Japanese foreign exchange intervention 
and lower exchange rate volatility after 1999. 
  Understanding that data segmentation considerably affects our estimation result, we 
test for the robustness of our results to different observation periods. Japanese foreign ex-
change intervention exhibits clear patterns of clusters. Based on Figure 1, we build ten periods 
of intervention clusters, which are indicated in the first line of Table 5. Then we set the 
boundaries of the segments mid-way between the intervention clusters. Although these inter-
vention clusters are again statistically arbitrary, we obtain additional evidence for a change in 
the relation between intervention and volatility. 
  The main findings are reported in Table 5 and largely match the findings of the yearly 
estimations. In the first cluster (1991), the γ1 coefficient is insignificant at the common levels.  
In the second cluster (1992), there is some evidence in favour of reduced volatility as the γ1 
coefficient is negative and highly significant. Between 1993 and 1998 (clusters 3 to 5), Japa-
nese foreign exchange intervention seems to have increased exchange rate volatility (positive 
and highly significant γ1 coefficients). In the sixth cluster (1997/98), the γ1 coefficient is posi-
tive but insignificant. For the period from 1999 up to 2004 (clusters 7 to 10), there is evidence 
of reduced exchange rate volatility. The γ1 coefficients are highly significant for all four sub-
periods.  
Based on the findings reported in Table 4 and Table 5, we can roughly divide the data 
into two regimes: From 1991 up to the late 1990s, Japanese foreign exchange intervention 
seems to have increased exchange rate volatility.  Starting from the late 1990s, it seems to 
have reduced volatility. In contrast to most former studies, we identify a structural break in 
the effects of Japanese foreign exchange intervention. Unlike Ito (2003), who has identified a 
structural break in 1995 (when Eisuke Sakikibara changed the intervention strategy) we find a 
structural break around the turn of the millennium.  
 
6  CHANGE POINT DETECTION AND ROLLING GARCH (1,1) COEFFICIENTS 
 
Although the sub-divided GARCH estimations give a more precise view of changing parame-
ter regimes in comparison to the global model, a non-arbitrary segmentation is desirable. We 
use the change-point detector for ARCH models proposed by Kokoszka and Leipus (1999, 
2000) to identify non-arbitrary sub-periods. The change-point detector is the estimator k ˆ of 
the true change-point k
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where k and t are indices for time, and the statistic Rt is given by 
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Intuitively, the detector measures the distance Rt between the means of the two segments that 
are induced by the hypothetical change point t. The estimated change-point k ˆ is set where 
this distance becomes maximal. For the rare case that more than one maximum exists, the first 
one is chosen.  
  In the stationary GARCH(1,1) model, the volatility mean is given by 
() β α ω ε θ − − = = 1 / ) (
2
t t E Eh , where  () β α ω θ , , =  is the vector of parameters of the conditional 
variance equation.  The change-point detector identifies segments of different volatility means 
() ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 / β α ω θ − − = t Eh  and  () ( ) 2 2 2 2 1 / β α ω θ − − = t Eh . Kokoszka and Leipus (1999) show 
that this estimator is consistent, converges in probability to the true change point k
* with rate 




t t W R T σ                      ( 7 )  
 
where Wt
0 is a Brownian Bridge and 
2 σ is the variance of Rt.  We follow Andreou and Ghy-
sels (2002) and use the VARHAC estimator of Den Haan and Levin (1997) for σ. Applying 
the detector to the New York closing rate, we identify two change-points that are significant 
at the 5% level. These are 05/07/1997 and 04/03/2000 as indicated in Table 6. 
We use these new segments for local GARCH estimations. The results reported in Ta-
ble 7 show a clear trend over time:  While interventions correlate positively and significantly 
with volatility in the first segment from 1991 through 1997, in the second and third segments 
the correlation between volatility and intervention is significantly negative. 
22 Alternative seg-
mentation at the turn of the millennium indicates increased volatility (and therefore ineffec-
                                                 
22   Ito and Melvin (1999) find a significant reduction in volatility around the deregulation of the Japanese foreign exchange 
market in early 1998. A dummy in the spirit of their analysis for the deregulation date April 1, 1998 does not change the 
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tive intervention) in the 1990s and less volatility (and therefore successful intervention) in the 
new millennium at highly significant levels. 
Together with the results of the estimation of the reaction function in Section 4, we 
find that between 1991 and 1997, interventions of the Japanese authorities in the yen/dollar 
market increased the volatility of the exchange rate. After 1997 there is evidence that inter-
vention has reduced exchange rate volatility.  
Where is the exact turning point in the effect of foreign exchange interventions on 
volatility? The yearly estimations reported in Table 4 would suggest reductions in volatility 
starting in January 1999. The estimation based on intervention clusters reported in Table 5 
suggests lower volatility starting from December 1999. The estimation based on change-point 
detection suggests lower volatility starting in May 1997.  
To get a clearer picture of the evolution of the effects of Japanese foreign exchange in-
tervention, we compute a rolling GARCH estimation for the volatility coefficient γ1.  For this 
purpose, we have to make two restrictive assumptions. First, for simplicity we have to restrict 
the estimation to the GARCH(1,1) model at the risk of misspecification. Second, we have to 
select a window size. To minimize possible bias caused by the window size, rolling GARCH 
coefficients are computed for the windows of 500, 750, 1000, 1250 and 1500 trading days.  
For the sake of brevity we report the results for 500 and 1500 trading days.  The other win-
dow sizes do not add much to what can be seen from these two. 
Figure 7 and 8 show the t-statistics for the rolling GARCH(1,1) γ1-coefficients. During 
the first sub-period, it shows a tendency for positive and significant t-values. Japanese foreign 
exchange intervention seems to increase the volatility of the yen/dollar exchange rate at statis-
tically significant levels. The lines at ±1.96 represent significance at the 5% level. After a 
certain transition period, the result is reversed. The γ1-coefficients now tend to be negative at 
statistically significant levels. In the new millennium at the latest, Japanese foreign exchange 
intervention seems to reduce the volatility of the yen/dollar exchange rate. 
Small window sizes (Figure 7) reveal a pattern of positive coefficients before 1997, a 
significant downward spike in 1997, a period of indeterminacy between 1997 and 1999, and 
negative significance after 1999. Increasing the window size (Figure 8) gives a much clearer 
picture of the downward trend.  The levels of significance gradually decline while the coeffi-
cient turns negative in the new millennium. Japanese foreign exchange intervention seems to 
have turned towards reducing volatility. 
Putting the results into perspective, a single day can not be identified as the break 
point.  Rather, the change in the coefficient towards significant reduction of volatility that  
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took place between 1997 and 2000 which may coincide with the shift in the liquidity con-
straint to Japanese foreign exchange intervention in March 1999. In the liquidity trap unsteril-
ized foreign exchange intervention may be more effective than sterilized intervention, because 
it may enhance the credibility of the Bank of Japan to stimulate the domestic economy. Suc-
cess would be engineered through the expectations channel (Spiegel 2003). Furthermore the 
additional money supply may trigger additional capital outflows (carry trade) that contribute 
to a weaker yen.  Figure 9 compares the fluctuations of the euro (German mark) and the yen 
against the dollar. Before the turn of the millennium, the yen fluctuated more against the dol-
lar than the German mark against the dollar. After that, the level of the Japanese yen was 
much less volatile than the euro against the dollar. This may be an indication for successful 
intervention. 
Note that our finding is in contrast to Ito (2003), who finds a structural break in 1995 
when Japanese monetary authorities changed their intervention strategy from small to large 
interventions. The possibility that coordinated intervention has increased the success seems 
unlikely, since the last US-Japanese coordinated intervention took place in June 1998 (one 
event).  
 
7  CONCLUSION 
 
We studied the effects of Japanese foreign exchange interventions on the volatility of the 
yen/dollar exchange rate between April 1991 and October 2004 using daily intervention data 
released by the Japanese Ministry of Finance. In contrast to most of the earlier studies, we 
allow for changes in this relation over time. While global GARCH estimations of the effect of 
Japanese foreign exchange intervention on the volatility of the yen/dollar exchange rate are 
inconclusive, local estimations provide evidence in favor of a structural break occurring 
around the turn of the millenium when Japanese foreign exchange intervention could effec-
tively remain unsterilized.as a result of the liquidity trap. 
We segment the data using calendar years, intervention clusters and by using a change-
point detector. Furthermore, we estimate rolling GARCH(1,1) coefficients.  The results suggest 
that up to the late 1990s, Japanese foreign exchange intervention correlates with increased vola-
tility of the yen/dollar exchange rate. After 1997 foreign exchange intervention is associated 
with lower exchange rate volatility, thereby indicating exchange rate stabilization.  
In summary, although we can not test systematically for this conjecture, the structural 
break in the effects of Japanese foreign exchange intervention on exchange rate volatility co-
incides with the liquidity trap of the Japanese economy, in which foreign exchange interven- 
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tion can be understood as being left unsterilized because of the nearly infinite money supply 
and the adjustment of the ceiling of the Bank of Japan’s current account. We do not find any 
support for a structural break in 1995 (shift from small intervention to large interventions) and 
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Figure 1: Cumulated Absolute Bank of Japan Current Account Balances and Cumu-
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Source:  Japan: Ministry of Finance. April 1991 – October 2004. Note same scale for Japan 
and the US (Figure 2).  
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Source: US Federal Reserve Board. Billion Dollars. April 1991 – October 2004. Note same scale for US and 
Japan (Figure 1). 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Bank of Japan and Federal Reserve Interventions, 
1991:04-2004:10 
  Bank of Japan  Federal Reserve 
Total intervention days  344 (351)  22 (36) 
Total transaction volume (billion dollars)  615.49 (625.41)  8.40 (17.2) 
Percentage of interventions in the yen/dollar market (volume)  98.41% 48.83% 
Unconditional intervention probability  9.71% (9.99%)  0.62% (1.01%) 
Number of days with dollar purchases (yen sales)  311 (313)  18 (30) 
Total amount of dollar purchases (billions)  577.79 7.30 
Mean absolute value of dollar purchases (billions)  1.86 0.41 
Number of days with dollar sales (yen purchases)  33 (38)  4 (6) 
Total amount of dollar sales (billions)  37.70 1.00 
Mean absolute value of dollar sales (billions)  1.14 0.25 
 Source: Japan: Ministry of Finance and Federal Reserve Board. Yen/dollar interventions (interventions against 
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Table 2: Binary Probit Reaction Function for Japanese Foreign Exchange Intervention, 
1991-2004 
 Japan  Pooled  Intervention 


















Intervention Dummy (t-1) 
D






Table 3: Global GARCH Estimation for Equation (1) to (3)  
[New York 3am (t)] 
Tokyo 5pm (t) 
New York Noon (t) 
[Tokyo 2am (t+1)] 
New York 5pm (t) 
[Tokyo 7am (t+1)] 
 
GARCH Coefficient GARCH  Coefficient  GARCH Coefficient 
Japan  (4,5)  γ1=.0024(.0011)** (2,3) γ1=.0006(.0007) (2,4)  γ1=.0015(.0008)* 
 
Japan  (1,1)  γ1=.0005(.0004) (1,1)  γ1=1e-5(.0002) (1,1)  γ1=5e-5(.0002) 
 
Pooled†  (4,4)  γ1=.0035(.0013)*** (2,3) γ1=.0007(.0007) (2,4) γ1=.0016(.0008)** 
 
Pooled†  (1,1)  γ1=.0005(.0004) (1,1)  γ1=4e-5(.0002) (1,1)  γ1=6e-5(.0002) 
 
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors according to Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992).  
* denotes significance at the 10 percent level.  
** denotes significance at the 5 percent level.  
*** denotes significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 4: Local GARCH Estimation for Equation
 (1) to (3) – Effect of Pooled Interventi
on on Yen/Dollar New Yo
rk
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Table 6:  Change-Points According to the Kokoszka and Leipus (1999) Detector 
Date  Observation Number  Statistic 
VARHAC k R n σ ˆ /  
Probability 
07-May-1997 1592  2.2466  0.000 
03-Apr-2000 2350  1.5932  0.013 
New York closing rate. Change points with confidence level 0.95 or higher. 
 
Table 7: Local GARCH Estimation for Equation (1) to (3) – Pooled Intervention for 
Change-Points as Indicated in Table 6 






GARCH specific. (BIC)  (1,5) (2,3) (1,1) 




































α2         0.0504*** 
(0.0115) 
 
















β4        0.3007*** 
(0.0474) 
  
β5        0.5564*** 
(0.0516) 
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New York Closing Rates.   
33
ECB
Working Paper Series No 650
June 2006
Table 8: Local GARCH Estimation for Equation (1) to (3) –  
Two sub-segments before and after Jan 1, 2000.  




GARCH specific. (BIC)  (1,5) (5,5) 
























α2         0.0529** 
(0.0216) 
α3         0.0531*** 
(0.0202) 
α4         0.0183 
(0.0176) 
α5         -0.0272* 
(0.0161) 
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